Nassau, New York and Toronto

Controls and operating authority

The control design specifies the system’s access, permitted actions and required evidence. Within those limits, the operating question is how much work it can complete reliably and where human involvement contributes to the result.

Access and actions

Permissions are enforced by the application, not by the model.

Access is enforced by the application and connected systems. Retrieved documents cannot grant permissions or alter approval rules. The implementation records the difference between a proposed action, an authorised instruction and an action confirmed by the destination system.

The wheel and bolts of a steel vault door

Independent verification

Checked independently of the model

Calculations, reconciliations and defined conditions should be checked in tested code where appropriate. A model agreeing with its own earlier answer provides limited independent assurance. Material conclusions need the relevant sources, calculations and unresolved discrepancies available for inspection.

Verification should require substantially less effort than performing the work again. Where a reviewer must reconstruct the entire result, the design has retained much of the original cost and may have created a weak review in practice.

Human review

Three kinds of decision in every service

Review requirements follow the consequence of the action, the applicable obligations and demonstrated performance. The design sets out three kinds of decision, specific to each service.

  1. 1

    Reserved decisions

    Approvals, judgments and client advice that only an authorised person may give on a case.

  2. 2

    Escalation conditions

    The conditions under which the system stops and refers a case, with all of its evidence.

  3. 3

    Approved scope

    The actions the system may complete itself, inside the limits approved for each service.

Human accountability does not require a person to perform or approve every intermediate step. Equally, a nominal approval with no usable evidence adds little control.

Testing and failure response

What every test includes

The evidence includes what the system actually did and what escaped its checks. Critical access or action failures have explicit stop and recovery rules.

  • Missing information
  • Conflicting information
  • Restricted records
  • Unexpected document instructions
  • Unavailable services
  • Partial execution

Model and process changes

Business requirements and model limitations are different kinds of constraint.

Access rules and approval obligations remain in force. A workaround or manual step introduced because a previous model could not handle the task should be reassessed when the capability changes.

Material changes are evaluated against the affected work and the approved operating scope. The purpose is to permit useful improvements while retaining control of the process and its approvals.

Operating responsibilities

Defined for each firm

The engagement defines each of these for the particular firm, as part of its operating design and supplier review:

Control desks and their dials in an arched control room
  1. 1Information handling
  2. 2Providers
  3. 3Monitoring
  4. 4Incident response
  5. 5Recovery
  6. 6Change ownership